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Academic Freedom and Tenure 
The Enlargement of the 
Classified Information System 
This is the second of two reports, prepared by a subcom- 
mittee of Committee A on Academic Freedom and Tenure 
and approved by the Committee for publication, on the 
subject of federal restrictions on scientific research. The 
first report, which appeared in the September-October 
issue of Academe, dealt with restraints by government 
officials on the free dissemination of nonclassified scien- 
tific ideas. The following report examines Executive Or- 
der 12356 (April 2, 1982), which prescribes a system for 
classifying information on the basis of national security 
concerns. Comments are welcome, and should be ad- 
dressed to the Association's Washington office. 
national government severely limits aca- 
demic research in the United States in two 
distinct ways. 
The first of these was the subject of a 
critical report in the September-October, 
1982, issue of Academe: Bulletin of the AAUP. That 
report discussed the network of statutes and regu- 
lations applicable to unclassified research, travel, and 
publication. The conclusion of the report, similar to 
that reached by several other national academic as- 
sociations, was that the scope of such restrictions, as 
written and applied, significantly abridges academic 
freedom beyond the needs of national security. In 
reviewing current restrictions on the sharing of re- 
search, exchange of scholars, and related means by 
which American academic scientists can remain in- 
formed of developments within their disciplines, the 
report also argued that insofar as academic freedom 
is improperly curtailed, the nation's security is ill- 
served: barriers to learning from others, and concern 
that innovative work may be suppressed whenever 
its originality might be useful even to the industrial 
or technological progress of other nations, are nec- 
essarily discouraging to the maintenance of research 
leadership within the United States. The relatively 
arbitrary prerogative of the government to forbid the 
circulation of research, itself unclassified, was a prin- 
cipal part of the report's criticism. 
Recent events have tended to justify that criticism. 
A university professor submitted two papers for 
presentation, and subsequent publication, to the 
twenty-sixth Annual Technical Symposium of the 
Society for Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers, 
meeting in San Diego in August, 1982. The professor's 
research was supported by a grant from the Air Force. 
The research was not classified, consistent with the 
university's stated policy "to undertake only those 
research projects in which the purpose, scope, meth- 
ods, and results can be fully and freely discussed." 
As he had done routinely in the past, the professor 
also sent the papers to the program officer in the Air 
Force. A week before the papers were scheduled for 
presentation, the professor was told by the Air Force 
officials that his papers had not been "cleared" and 
therefore they should not be presented to the sym- 
posium. The professor withdrew the papers and did 
not attend the meeting in San Diego. Some three 
months later the papers were "cleared" by the De- 
partment of Defense. 
Our critical report on the large variety of threats to 
unclassified research postponed a review of the clas- 
sification system itself until this report. Nonetheless, 
the implication of our earlier report was to favor a 
limited classification system, to the extent that such 
a system may minimize uncertainty and provide a 
less random threat to academic freedom. 
Certain research conducted in universities may 
have (and sometimes does have) immediate and direct 
national security implications. Some of that work is 
undertaken pursuant to Department of Defense con- 
tracts. Universities generally recognize that such ar- 
rangements may compromise their commitment to 
academic freedom, and they vary in their policies 
respecting the wisdom and acceptability of such 
arrangements. The AAUP has thought it inappro- 
priate to condemn faculties and universities for mak- 
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ing such arrangements per se, but it has regularly 
expressed concern that inconsistency with academic 
freedom is a genuine danger which all academic 
institutions should weigh carefully in the research 
and restrictions they accept. 
In this respect a clear and circumspect classification 
system may be both important and helpful. Ideally, 
a proper classification system will provide reasonable 
certainty as to what research and publication must 
necessarily be treated in confidence, according to 
needs of national security that are plain and compel- 
ling. It will enable universities and their faculties to 
make informed decisions about their research. Very 
different, and strongly objectionable, is a classification 
system that sweeps within it virtually anything con- 
ceivably useful industrially, technically, or militarily 
to at least someone, administered by officials placed 
in a position where virtually any doubt must move 
them to classify (to avoid having to answer for 
appearing too cavalier about national security). When 
laid alongside a network of criminal statutes and ad 
hoc regulations that serve to inhibit broadly unclas- 
sified research as well, such a classification system 
magnifies hazards to academic freedom. It must 
compound the problems of universities in making 
principled decisions and threaten the capacity of 
scholars and scientists in the United States to advance 
the frontiers of knowledge. 
Here we review briefly recent changes introduced 
into the classification system by Executive Order 
12356, issued by President Reagan on April 2, 1982. 
A recent report of the National Academy of Sciences 
Panel on Scientific Communication and National Se- 
curity, a report we think sensitive and sound, con- 
cludes that open and free scientific communication is 
essential for ensuring long-term national security.1 
We agree. We believe the enlargement of the classi- 
fication system contemplated in Executive Order 12356 
is seriously mistaken. It poses an unwarranted threat 
to academic freedom and hence to scientific progress 
and the national security. 
I. Summary of Recent Changes 
Executive Order 12356 is the most recent presidential 
executive order prescribing a system for classifying 
and declassifying information on the basis of national 
security concerns. President Franklin Roosevelt is- 
sued the first such order in 1940. Succeeding executive 
orders were signed by Presidents Truman, Eisen- 
hower, Nixon, and Carter. In their details, these 
earlier executive orders differed from one another on 
such matters as what information was to be classified, 
for what period of time, and according to what 
standards. Their similarities, however, are more note- 
worthy than their differences. They sought to pre- 
serve the public's interest in the free circulation of 
knowledge by limiting classification authority, by 
defining precisely the purposes and limits of classi- 
fication, and by providing procedures for declassifi- 
cation. 
By contrast, Executive Order 12356 significantly 
broadens the authority of government agencies to 
classify information as secret. It removes a previous 
requirement for classification that damage to the 
national security be identifiable. It resolves doubts 
about the need to classify in favor of classification. It 
permits indefinite classification. It provides for re- 
classification of declassified and publicly released 
information. It expands the categories of information 
subject to classification to include nonclassified re- 
search developed by scientific investigators outside 
the government. 
II. Main Provisions 
The preamble to Executive Order 12356 states that 
the "interests of the United States and its citizens 
require that certain information concerning the na- 
tional defense and foreign relations be protected 
against unauthorized disclosure." To prevent "un- 
authorized disclosure," the order establishes three 
levels of classification: "top secret," "secret," and 
"confidential." The standards for "top secret" and 
"secret" are the same as in previous executive orders. 
However, Executive Order 12356 omits the earlier 
qualifying word "identifiable" in describing the dam- 
age to the national security that can justify classifi- 
cation at the lowest, or "confidential," level. The text 
reads: "confidential shall be applied to information, 
the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably 
could be expected to cause damage to the national 
security." At a congressional hearing, a deputy as- 
sistant attorney general explained the deletion of the 
requirement of "identifiability" as follows: 
Every new qualifier or adjective, such as "identifiable," 
added to the requirement of showing "damage" or any 
other requisite element of proper classification, raises 
new uncertainties or areas of ambiguity that may lead 
to litigation. . . .[T]he requirement of "identifiable" 
damage may be construed to suggest that disclosure 
must cause some specific or precise damage, a require- 
ment that the government might not reasonably be 
able to meet in some cases. . . . Provisions of such 
orders should be simple, general, less complex and 
require no more precision than the subject matter rea- 
sonably allows. The requirement of "identifiable" dam- 
age fails on all these counts. 
In the event that a government official is uncertain 
about whether to classify information, the doubt will 
be resolved in favor of classification pending a final 
determination within thirty days. In addition, if there 
is doubt about the level of classification, the infor- 
mation will be classified at a higher level, also pending 
a final decision within thirty days. Once information 
is classified, it can remain so at the discretion of 
government officials "as long as required by national 
security considerations." There is no provision in 
Executive Order 12356 for justifying the need for 
classification beyond a stated period of time (President 
1 Excerpts from the report of the National Academy of Sciences 
are reprinted below as an appendix to this report. 
10a ACADEME January-February 1983 
Nixon's executive order called for automatic declas- 
sification after thirty years, unless the government 
determined that continued classification was still 
necessary and set a time for eventual declassification; 
President Carter's executive order established a six- 
year declassification period), and the order is silent 
as to whether declassifying information is generally 
desirable. 
If information has been declassified, it may be 
reclassified under Executive Order 12356 following 
the requirements for classification. Information which 
has been properly declassified and is in the public 
domain apparently may remain "under the control" 
of the government (the order defines information as 
"any information or materials . . . that is owned by, 
produced by or for, or is under the control of the 
United States Government") and thus can be re- 
claimed by the government. 
The executive order provides for limitations on 
classification. It states that "basic scientific research 
information not clearly related to the national security 
may not be classified." Early drafts of the executive 
order had not included this provision, which appears 
in the executive order issued by President Carter. 
Protests from the scientific community and others led 
to its retention. However, as will be discussed later, 
it is not clear what this limitation actually safeguards. 
Sanctions for violations of the executive order may 
be imposed on the government's "contractors, licen- 
sees, and grantees." 
III. Comments 
Basic national security obviously requires some clas- 
sification of information as secret. It is also obvious 
that freedom to engage in academic research and to 
publish the results is essential to advance knowledge 
and to sustain our democratic society. The possibility 
for friction between classification and academic free- 
dom is always there. Secrecy, an inescapable element 
in classification, is fundamentally inconsistent with 
open inquiry. The friction can be reduced if classifi- 
cation is invoked before research has begun and is 
cautiously applied for a limited period of time and 
only to matters of direct military significance. 
Classification defeats its own purpose, however, if 
it imperils the freedoms it is meant to protect. In our 
judgment, Executive Order 12356 does exactly that. 
It gives unprecedented authority to government of- 
ficials to intrude at will in controlling academic re- 
search that depends upon federal support. The order 
permits and encourages the classification of infor- 
mation merely on the speculative assertion that its 
open dissemination might damage the national se- 
curity. The classification may be imposed at whatever 
stage a research project has reached and can be 
maintained for as long as the government deems 
prudent. Academic research not born classified may, 
under this order, die classified. 
The provision in the Executive Order that "basic 
scientific research information not clearly related to 
the national security may not be classified" carries 
the suggestion that basic scientific research may be 
classified if the government determines it to be "clearly 
related to the national security." This standard for 
classification is looser still than "could be expected 
to cause damage to the national security." We may 
be reading too much into this provision; we hope 
that it will be interpreted simply as an exemption 
and nothing more. Unfortunately, even with the most 
favorable gloss the exemption strikes us as a weak 
safeguard for scientific inquiry. Under Executive Or- 
der 12356, information "produced by or for" the 
government is subject to classification, and sanctions 
may be imposed on government "contractors and 
grantees" who violate the executive order. There is 
an exemption from classification for "basic scientific 
research not clearly related to the national security," 
yet the government official who cannot fix a clear 
relationship but nonetheless has doubts could still 
classify funded or contracted research consistent with 
other provisions of the executive order. Considering 
the emphasis placed on classification in the executive 
order, it seems all too likely that uncertainty will be 
resolved in favor of restraints. 
Academic researchers require freedom and security 
to take the risk of occasionally being wrong. In their 
pursuit of knowledge they should not have to look 
backward either in hope of favor or in fear of disfavor. 
However, in an era of reduced federal support for 
research except in the area of national security, and 
with investments in research programs and facilities 
significantly reliant upon federal funding already 
having been made, the academic researcher is under 
enormous pressure to submit to classification no 
matter how restrictive or apparently arbitrary the 
demand. The adverse effects on academic freedom 
and thus on the advancement of knowledge and on 
the national security can be grave. 
The executive order can inhibit academic research- 
ers and research institutions from making long-term 
intellectual investments in research projects that are 
potentially classifiable. It can serve to foster unnec- 
essary duplication of research efforts. It is likely to 
encourage reluctance to share research methods and 
results with professional colleagues because of un- 
certainty as to whether something that a government 
official can call harmful to the national security may 
be unwittingly revealed. There is the bleak prospect 
of academic researchers who are walled-off from each 
other, either by classification or by the worry that it 
might be imposed, thus forestalling mutual enrich- 
ment through the exchange of ideas and constructive 
criticism. Those in government concerned with the 
uses of new knowledge are not likely to obtain the 
benefit of the widest possible evaluation of their plans 
and projects. All these consequences of the executive 
order are likely to be felt outside as well as within 
the field of research in which classification is imposed. 
The government has not put forward any compel- 
ling reasons for instituting a system of classification 
that is so at odds with previous systems. The gov- 
ernment's own reports, including reports issued by 
the Department of Defense, seriously question the 
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cost, effectiveness, and need for more classification. 
These reports draw particular attention to the dangers 
of overclassification. 
Executive Order 12356 requires drastic revision if 
it is to be tolerable to a community of higher learning 
committed to academic freedom. The application of 
the order to nonclassified information, which is al- 
ready subject to potential restraints under existing 
laws and regulations, is at best superfluous. The 
heavy emphasis on classification is misplaced: the 
provision for reclassification should be removed, and 
the standards for classification rewritten so that they 
do not sweep unnecessarily broadly. 
If the government's executive order or its successor 
continues to deny due recognition to the need of the 
independent research scholar for academic freedom, 
the cost will be borne not only by the researchers 
who are affected but by the nation as a whole. 
Robert A. Rosenbaum (Mathematics), 
Wesleyan University, Chairman 
Morton J. Tenzer (Political Science), 
University of Connecticut 
Stephen H. Unger (Computer Science), 
Columbia University 
William Van Alstyne (Law), 
Duke University 
Jonathan Knight, Staff 
Commenting on the prepublication text of this report, 
Richard G. Stilwell, deputy in the Office of the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provided a 
detailed reply which included the following points: 
report takes issues with the deletion of the 
word "identifiable" from the damage test for 
assignment of the Confidential security classi- 
fication. It should be noted that this word was not 
used in previous Executive orders other than the one 
signed by President Carter. Its deletion in the current 
Order does not change the way in which people 
classify nor does it change what may be classified. 
Executive Order 12356 continues the two-step clas- 
sification process. An original classification authority 
must first determine that information being consid- 
ered for classification falls within one of the several 
categories of information that are classifiable. Only 
upon an affirmative determination that the informa- 
tion is classifiable may the classification authority 
proceed to the second step. That step involves a 
determination that unauthorized disclosure of the 
information would or would not cause a degree of 
damage to the national security. In making that 
determination, one naturally must envision what 
damage, if any, reasonably could be expected to 
occur. Thus, a decision to classify at the second step 
inherently involves identification of the damage. 
Your report states, in essence, that when there is 
doubt regarding whether information should be clas- 
sified, the new Executive Order requires classification. 
Similarly, the report indicates that when there is 
doubt about the level of classification, the Order 
requires classification at the higher level. In fact, 
Executive Order 12356, and the Department's imple- 
menting Regulation, specify that when in doubt, 
safeguard the information as though it were classified 
or classified at the higher level until a classification 
decision is made (within thirty days). "Safeguard" as 
used here is quite distinct from classification. The 
terms are not synonymous and should not be con- 
fused. 
There is concern expressed that the new Executive 
Order is silent on whether declassifying information 
is generally desirable. However, the Order does state 
that "information shall be declassified or downgraded 
as soon as national security considerations permit." 
Moreover, the Order itself provides for declassifica- 
tion in three distinct ways, namely, through the 
setting of dates or events for automatic declassifica- 
tion, systematic review for declassification, and man- 
datory review for declassification. What has been 
removed are artificially set time limits for automatic 
declassification. What remains is provision for auto- 
matic declassification when it can be determined. 
It is true that information that has been disclosed 
may be reclassified under the terms of this Order but 
only if it may reasonably be recovered. Within the 
Department of Defense, only four officials, the Sec- 
retary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three 
Military Departments, may exercise this authority. I 
think that we can agree that classification of infor- 
mation that is broadly held by the public only serves 
to strain the credibility of the security classification 
system. But, it is the intent of the new Order to 
recognize that the government, in limited circum- 
stances, should be able to reclassify information that 
has been released incorrectly or inadvertently but 
only to a few people who then can be contacted and 
agreement reached concerning the sensitivity of the 
information. 
The report recognizes that basic scientific research 
not clearly related to the national security cannot be 
classified. However, the report permits readers to 
conclude that there exists a lesser standard for the 
classification of such information. Let me assure you 
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that this is not correct; the Order expressly prohibits 
classification of basic scientific research not clearly 
related to the national security. Moreover, Defense 
regulations stipulate that the classification of basic 
scientific research would be appropriate only if the 
information concerns an unusually significant scien- 
tific breakthrough and there is sound reason to believe 
that the information is not known and it supplies the 
United States an advantage related directly to the 
national security. 
In summary, I think it fair to characterize this Order 
not as a drastic departure from past practice but rather 
as a practical approach to the security needs of 
government. The trend toward openness in govern- 
ment had run virtually uninterrupted for the past 
thirty years. It was a trend that the Department of 
Defense supported over those years and it long has 
been the Department's policy not to constrain infor- 
mation the public requires to be informed sufficiently 
about the activities and operating functions of the 
Department. However, Executive Order 12065 treated 
classification almost as an evil to be avoided at all 
cost. The new Executive Order seeks to redress this 
imbalance and provide a more even approach to the 
issues of protection versus openness. 
APPENDIX 
Report of the National Academy of Sciences 
Panel on Scientific Communication and National Security 
Principles for University Research 
The Panel concludes that the vast majority of university 
research, whether basic or applied, should be subject to no 
limitations on access or communications. 
Undoubtedly, some things must, by their very nature, 
be kept secret. It is clearly important, for example, to keep 
secret those properties of actual weapons systems that 
would enable a potential enemy to develop effective coun- 
termeasures. Where specific information must perforce be 
kept secret, it should be classified strictly and guarded 
carefully. The decision to accept or reject classified research 
projects or to establish off-campus classified facilities is a 
matter to be decided by universities. 
The Panel concludes that there are a few gray areas of 
research that are sensitive from a security standpoint, but 
where classification is not appropriate. These research areas 
are at the ill-defined boundaries between basic research 
and application and are characteristic of fields where the 
time from discovery to application is short. At present, a 
portion of the field of microelectronics is the most visible 
among the small handful of such new technologies. 
Guidelines for Classified and Gray-Area Research 
While it is impossible to specify classified and gray-area 
research with precision, there are some broad criteria that 
help to define the few areas in question. 
The Panel recommends that no restriction of any kind 
limiting access or communication should be applied to any 
area of university research, be it basic or applied, unless it 
involves a technology meeting all of the following criteria: 
The technology is developing rapidly, and the time 
from basic science to application is short; 
The technology has identifiable direct military applica- 
tions; or it is dual-use and involves process or produc- 
tion-related techniques; 
Transfer of the technology would give the U.S.S.R. a 
significant near-term military advantage; and 
The United States is the only source of information 
about the technology, or other friendly nations that 
could also be the source have control systems as secure 
as ours. 
In order to specify the areas where greater control would 
be appropriate, it may be useful to look at some examples 
of research that do not meet all of the above four criteria. 
Monoclonal antibody research is developing rapidly, and 
the interval from basic discovery to application may be 
short; but there appears to be no way in which this research 
could result in a significant military advance. Hence, there 
should be no need to impose controls in this field. Similarly, 
the science underlying aerodynamic design, even though 
it possesses obvious military significance, is a mature, 
slowly evolving field that is unlikely to provide any signif- 
icant near-term military advantage to the Soviets. Thus, it 
too should be free of controls. 
The Panel recommends that if government-supported 
research demonstrably will lead to military products in a 
short time, classification should be considered. It should 
be noted that most universities will not undertake classified 
work, and some will undertake it only in off-campus 
facilities. 
In those few cases of government-sponsored research 
where national security considerations may require restric- 
tions on publication, limitations on foreign access to facil- 
ities, or security classification, the Panel believes that certain 
guiding principles and procedures should be followed. The 
provisions of EAR [Export Administration Regulations of 
the Department of Commerce] and ITAR [International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations of the Department of State] 
should not be invoked to deal with gray areas in govern- 
ment-funded university research. Rather, in the Panel's 
view, appropriate procedures should be incorporated in 
research contracts or other written agreements in those 
rare cases where some measure of control is required. The 
advantages of such provisions are that they give prior notice 
to the researcher that the funded research may turn out to 
have national security significance and foster a spirit of 
negotiated accommodation that helps prevent future mis- 
understandings about the researcher's obligations and re- 
course. 
The Panel recommends that in the limited number of 
instances in which all of the above criteria are met but 
classification is unwarranted, the values of open science 
can be preserved and the needs of government can be met 
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by written agreements no more restrictive than the follow- 
ing: 
a) Prohibition of direct participation in government- 
supported research projects by nationals of designated 
foreign countries, with no attempt made to limit physi- 
cal access to university space or facilities or enrollment 
in any classroom course of study. Moreover, where 
such prohibition has been imposed by visa or contrac- 
tually agreed upon, it is not inappropriate for govern- 
ment-university contracts to permit the government to 
ask a university to report those instances coming to the 
university's attention in which the stipulated foreign 
nationals seek participation in such activities, however 
supported. It is recognized that some universities will 
regard such reporting requests as objectionable. Such 
requests, however, should not require surveillance or 
monitoring of foreign nationals by the universities. 
Restrictions on access to nonclassified research, 
whether to research results or to physical facilities, are 
outside the normal operating procedures of research 
universities. It is, of course, within the power of the 
government to deny or issue conditional visas to for- 
eign nationals who are believed to be seeking skills or 
technical data that will significantly damage our na- 
tional security. In extraordinary circumstances, the gov- 
ernment may seek to ensure that government-provided 
resources are not used to support nationals of specified 
countries who seek to work in specified programs. Ac- 
cess to program resources by nationals of designated 
foreign countries may be limited either through re- 
search contract terms or through other agreements ne- 
gotiated with particular universities. Such contracts or 
agreements should not attempt to deny physical access 
to any university space or facility to any person ac- 
cepted by the university into its community. The dan- 
ger to national security lies in the immersion of a sus- 
pect visitor over an extended period of time, not in 
casual observation of equipment or research data. 
b) Submission of stipulated manuscripts simultane- 
ously to the publisher and to the federal agency con- 
tract officer, with the federal agency then having sixty 
days to seek modification in the manuscript. The re- 
view period is not intended to give the government the 
power to order changes: the right and freedom to pub- 
lish remain with the university, as they do with all 
unclassified research. This does not, of course, detract 
from the government's ultimate power to classify in 
accordance with law any research it has supported. 
In some cases, a contractual agreement providing for 
simultaneous review of manuscripts at the time of their 
submission to scientific journals may be appropriate. A 
requirement for government comment within sixty days of 
submission of the manuscripts should provide adequate 
time for the government to assess the potential near-term 
military significance of the dissemination and to reach 
accommodation with the researcher before public release. 
Experience suggests that disagreements about publication 
can almost always be resolved between the principal in- 
vestigator and the technical contract manager. The Panel 
emphasizes that its support for a review period is not 
intended to support any government effort to veto publi- 
cation, or to limit the government's power to classify, in 
accordance with law, any research it has supported. 
To help government policy officials to supervise the 
application of the gray-area research criteria and to gain 
perspective on the longer-term effects of the restrictions 
imposed on such research, there is a need to ensure that 
an accurate accounting of such restrictions is kept. 
The Panel recommends that in cases where the govern- 
ment places such restrictions on scientific communication 
through contracts or other written agreements, it should 
be obligated to record and tabulate the instances of those 
restrictions on a regular basis. 
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